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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts are relevant for consideration for purposes of this petition for 
rehearing. 
1. Robin and LaRee Nielsen were divorced pursuant to an order dated July 16, 1984. R.381 
2. Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the court awarded one half of the real property and the 
home in which they lived (716 West 580 South, Orem, Utah) to each party excepting a $6,000.00 
credit going to Robin Nielsen. 
3. Pursuant to decree of divorce the family home was to be sold at the time that the youngest 
child turned 18. R.381 
4. On January 8, 1986 Robin Nielsen transferred his interest in the real property awarded to 
him in the divorce by quit claim deed which was recorded in the Utah County Recorder's Office 
on January 10, 1986 to Rod Nielsen. R, 377-378. 
5. This action was brought on March 7, 1995. R. 1-5 
6. The complaint set forth two causes of action. The first cause of action sought recovery 
against the family home under the fraudulent conveyance statutes while the second sought 
contribution from the defendants for expenditures allegedly made by the plaintiff during her 
occupancy of the home. R.l-5 
7. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 98 
8. In response to that motion the plaintiff raised for the first time the argument that she was 
somehow entitled to the property under the doctrine of constructive trust. 
9. By memorandum decision dated November 15, 1996 the trial court partially granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. R. 256 
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10. Within that memorandum decision the court specifically held the plaintiffs claims brought 
under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act and under the doctrine of constructive trust were barred 
by the relevant statute of limitations. The court also found that the claim for constructive trust was 
barred due to plaintiffs' lack of standing. R. 250. 
11. The sole issue upon which the court did not grant defendants summary judgment was the 
issue of the offsets claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant Rod Nielsen. The court found 
there existed issues of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment on that issue. R. 
250. 
12. At the time of the summary judgment hearing additional evidence was presented showing 
that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the transfer of the property prior to March 15, 
1991. The court however, under the standard of a motion for summary judgment, adopted the facts 
most favorable to the plaintiff who found that she found out about the transfer "no later than 
March 15, 1991". R. 250 
13. After trial the court found in defendants favor, on what was to have been the sole 
remaining cause of action, but awarded judgment to the plaintiff on the basis of the argument of 
constructive trust which the court had previously found to be barred. 
14. That finding has been upheld by this court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS RULING WITH RESPECT TO THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
A. The Statute of Limitations Had Expired. 
The finding of the trial court was that Rod Nielsen was holding the half interest in the 
home from Robin Nielsen in constructive trust for Robin Nielsen. R. 374-375. This court likewise 
recognized that that was the finding of the trial court.1 
This court found that the correct statute of limitations is a four year statute of limitations 
found in UCA § 78-12-25(3). This court goes on to analyze the time frame under which LaRee 
Nielsen had notice of the constructive trust and applied the "discovery rule" to determine when 
the statutory should run. 
There are two problems with this analysis. First, the question is not when did LaRee 
Nielsen's cause of action accrue but when did the cause of action itself accrue. A litigant can not 
and should not be entitled to more rights than the actual parties themselves. There is no claim that 
LaRee Nielsen had a claim for constructive trust in this action. The claim is simply that Robin 
Nielsen had one. The test therefore is not when LaRee Nielsen knew of the cause of action but 
when Robin Nielsen could have or should have known of that cause. The correct time frame for 
calculating the statute of limitations would begin at the time that the property was transferred by 
Robin to Rod Nielsen. That was on January 8, 1986. 
*On page 6 of this court's memorandum decision it states "we conclude that the trial court 
here did not abuse its broad discretion in determining that equity required the imposition of a 
constructive trust transferring title from Rod to Robin." 
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A contrary result totally invalidates the recording statutes with respect to transferring 
property amongst family members. In the court's analysis a third party merely need claim they had 
no notice of the transfer of the property that was otherwise sold or transferred to a family member 
in order to be able to challenge any such transfer at any time after. This analysis gives a third 
party greater rights than the actual party who has the claim itself. It also invalidates the statute 
of limitations created by the legislature in the fraudulent conveyance statute U.C.A. § 25-6-10. 
There is no claim that Robin Nielsen could have at the time of this litigation made a claim against 
Rod Nielsen for constructive trust. If Robin Nielsen could not make such a claim LaRee Nielsen 
should not be able to extend the statute of limitations in order to receive this additional benefit. 
B. If the Discovery Rules Were Available to LaRee Nielsen the Matter Should Be 
Remanded for Further Consideration by the Trial Court. 
The finding of the trial court which has been upheld by this court denies the defendants 
their rights to due process. The issue of constructive trust had been decided in the defendants favor 
prior to the time of the trial. This court pointed out "Although the records shows LaRee may have 
had constructive notice of the deed when it was recorded defendants have failed to martial any 
evidence that she had actual or constructive notice of the facts which would justify imposing the 
constructive trust before May 15, 1991." 
Evidence of LaRee's prior knowledge was presented at the summary judgment stage of the 
proceeding. At that time judgment was granted to the defendants. The defendants did not present 
any additional evidence at trial or develop that evidence at trial because the issue had already been 
decided. 
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Clearly it is a denial of due process to the defendants in this case to have granted them 
judgment so as to lull them in to not presenting certain evidence at trial and then to reverse that 
very judgment and later deny the defendants appeal on the basis that there was no evidence to 
marshal in support of the defenses. 
If this court finds that LaRee Nielsen is entitled to benefits that Robin Nielsen could never 
have, i.e. an extension of the statute of limitations, then at a bare minimum the issue as to when 
the statute of limitation should run based on LaRee Nielsen's knowledge should be remanded for 
determination by the trial court upon the full consideration of all of the evidence now that the 
defendants know that there is an issue at controversy. 
To find that the defendants are precluded from raising that evidence at this stage would in 
essence make motions for partial summary judgment meaningless. The whole point of such 
motions is to reduce the amount of material to be presented at the time of trial. McBride v. Jones, 
615 P.2d 431 (Utah 1980). If you had to present all of the same material regardless of the outcome 
of a summary judgment motion than the motion itself becomes a waste of the court and the parties 
time. 
C. The Trial Court's Initial Determination That Plaintiffs Constructive Trust 
Was Barred by the Statute of Limitations Was Correct, 
The trial court, on defendant's motion for summary judgment, determined that the 
fraudulent conveyance and constructive trust claims from the plaintiff were barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
Im making that determination the court applied the statute of limitations found in UCA § 
25-6-10. 
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This is the statutory provision in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act U.C.A. §25-6-1 
et.seq. That statute of limitations is the correct one to be applied in this case. 
The specific findings of the court in this case and the findings upheld in this court in the 
court's decision were that Robin Nielsen owed LaRee Nielsen back child support and alimony. 
The finding also was that the defendant Rod Nielsen was holding real property in trust for 
defendant Robin Nielsen. 
The court then took the stretch, which has been approved by this court, that the property 
in some fashion is returned to Robin Nielsen and from there can be used directly to satisfy the 
claims of Mrs. Nielsen against Robin. 
Under the analysis taken by the trial court Mrs. Nielsen is not the beneficiary of the 
constructive trust she is simply a creditor. There has been no finding that Mrs. Nielsen was to be 
the beneficiary of a constructive trust nor has there been any argument to that effect. The argument 
solely goes as between Rod Nielsen and Robin Nielsen. 
With respect to creditors the rights of a party have been specifically defined by the 
legislature in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. This act preempts any claim for a third party 
creditor that would otherwise allow them to piggy back onto Robin Nielsen supposed rights under 
a constructive trust. 
The statute of limitations for this action is found in UCA § 25-6-10. This statute of 
limitations contains a modified version of the discovery rule. Rather than having the entire period 
begin anew in which a person can file there action it provides for an additional year after the 
discovery is made or for four years after the transfer is made. UCA § 26-6-10. 
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Under either of these scenarios, even accepting the March 15, 1991 discovery date as the 
date of discovery, LaRee Nielsen's claims are barred. 
Although the issue of a constructive trust in favor of LaRee Nielsen was not argued to the 
trial court nor found by the trial court, this court appeared to address that issue citing with 
approval the cases of Parks v. Zions First National Bank. 673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983) and Adams 
v. Jankouskas. 452 A.2d 148 (Del. 1982). Neither of these cases would avail a third party creditor 
such as Mrs. Nielsen. Both the Parks and Adams cases involve situations where a married couple 
acquired property during their marriage and upon the death of the wife it was discovered that the 
wife had divested of the totality of the marital property to someone other than the surviving 
spouse. 
The divestiture of the totality of the property is the key distinction between those cases and 
the case before this court. In this case the parties were divorced. By way of the divorce decree the 
parties separate interests in the respective marital assets had already been determined. Mrs. 
Nielsen had no claim to the property in this case except that of any other creditor. 
The importance of this distinction was recognized by the Supreme Court in the Parks case. 
In Parks the Supreme Court stated: 
This evidence clearly and adequately supports the trial court's finding that plaintiffs labors 
and earning were responsible for the acquisition of a substantial portion of the marital 
estate. It is therefore appropriate to conclude that plaintiff had an "equitable interest" in 
the subject property and the total inclusion of such property in the estate of Mrs. Parks 
constituted "an unjust enrichment" of her estate. Accordingly, we hold that the trial courts 
imposition of a constructive trust upon the estate of Mrs. Parks was justified, At least as 
to that portion representing plaintiff's proven interest therein." 
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Parks at 600.2 (emphasis added) 
Unlike the situation in Parks or Adams, the asset at issue here belonged solely to Robin 
Nielsen. It was not a marital asset belonging to LaRee Nielsen. 
II. THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED ON THE ISSUE OF CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST. 
No argument was presented at the time of trial with respect to the burden of proof of the 
plaintiff with regards to establishing a constructive trust. Indeed the issue was not addressed to the 
court because the court had specifically ruled already that the claim was barred, both by the statute 
of limitations and by lack of privity. 
Because summary judgment had been granted to the defendants they did not bring evidence 
or argument with respect to the elements of constructive trust. Defendants should be allowed to 
martial evidence, and present it to the trial court so that a determination of this issue can be made 
fully and fairly. 
CONCLUSION 
By virtue of the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants the sole issues 
that were to be before the court at the time of trial were the determination of the amount of 
alimony and child support owed by Robin Nielsen and the issue of contribution on behalf of Rod 
Nielsen. 
2The Adams case was decided on a similar basis. "In this appeal we face certain unique 
questions of Delaware law arising from a post-trial decision of the court of chancery imposing 
either a constructive or resulting trust on half of the assets, claimed to be part of the estate of 
Stella Jankouskas, also known as Stella Jann (Stella) in favor of John Jankouskas also known as 
John Jann (John)." Adams at 150 (emphasis added). 
8 
Allowing the trial court to expand that to add a cause of action for and a finding in favor 
of the plaintiff for constructive trust when that very claim had already been determined to be 
barred denies the defendants' due process. 
The trial court seemingly got around this problem by finding the constructive trust to be 
from Rod Nielsen to Robin Nielsen with a subsequent transfer to LaRee Nielsen. If this is the case 
then Robin Nielsen's claim would have been barred by the statute of limitations and LaRee Nielsen 
should have no rights in excess of those of the party to whom they actually belong. 
The legislature has addressed this issue or problem by adopting the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act. That right preempts any common law claims that LaRee Nielsen might be making. 
Under that act it was determined, initially correctly, by the trial court LaRee Nielsen's claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
Defendants therefore respectfully requests the court reconsider its ruling and determine that 
the claims of LaRee Nielsen for constructive trust are barred by the applicable statutes of 
limitations. 
In the event the court finds the claims not barred by the statute of limitations, as a matter 
of law, the defendants request that the same issues being remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of the date of actual or sufficient constructive knowledge on the part of LaRee 
Nielsen to beginning the running of the statute of limitations. 
The court should also remand the matter back to the trial court for four specific findings 
in evidence on the issue of the availability of constructive trust. In the event the statute of 
limitations does not bar Mrs. Nielsen's constructive trust claims the same should be returned to 
9 
the trial court for consideration of evidence as to the elements as to the elements of that cause of 
action in order to provide due process to the defendants. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2000. 
LARSON, TURNER, FAIRBANKS & DALBY 
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
The above signed counsel hereby certifies that this Petition for Rehearing is submitted in 
good faith and without intention to further hinder or delay proceedings in this case. 
Shawn D. Turner 
Nil LSLN REM 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of March, 2000, I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy 
of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to the following: 
Robert L. Moody (2302) 
MOODY & BROWN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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